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ESSAY - “In the period 1951-1975 Britain’s stature in the world remained stable.”

Note: these are essays written by me and have not been marked, so may contain mistakes. Please use for revision purposes only :) 

“In the period 1951-1975 Britain’s stature in the world remained stable.” To what extent do you agree with this? (45 marks)

Britain’s stature in the world between 1951 and 1975 was taking a turn for the worst. The worldwide empire was disintegrating. Victorian imperial greatness was beginning to be just a faded memory. Yet, some historians claim Britain still held onto that reputation due to the strong relationship with the USA and Britain’s role in the Cold War. Nevertheless, with the rapid decline in military power, economy and the insistent rejections from the EEC, it is clear that Britain stature in the world was certainly very fragile one.

Firstly, the illusion of world power dominated the thoughts of British politicians. The Suez crisis of 1956 is prime example of this fallacious dream. Driven by Anthony Eden, he unhesitatingly made secret deals with France and Israel to invade Egypt, full of confidence that Britain could take the Suez Canal from Egypt’s new nationalist leader, Colonel Nasser. The whole episode however proved to be a disaster. The USA’s outrage and pressure of withdrawal was followed through in humiliation. The alignment with Israel harmed Britain’s position throughout the Middle East and relations with the French were strained as they were filled with contempt for the behaviour of their British partners. Britain’s stature in the world had, without doubt, been shaken.

With the public display of Britain’s weakness militarily and financially due to the Suez debacle, the rapid decolonisation was unstoppable. Macmillan’s “wind of change” swept through Britain and the colonies, encouraging the growth of independent movements. By 1964, many African countries such as Ghana, Kenya and Uganda had become independent, with other countries around the world following over the next several years. The message from these countries was loud and clear – Britain was neither important them nor needed any longer. 

Likewise, the issue with Southern Rhodesia seemed to expose British impotence almost cruelly. Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith declared a unilateral declaration of independence which would hardly be acceptable when the overwhelming black majority would be left completely disenfranchised. Having originally thought the problem will be solved with diplomacy in a matter of weeks, Wilson found himself facing the same problem for years. British trade sanctions and embargos proved futile with companies ignoring the requests in favour of other interests. The intervention of South Africa and the USA finally solved the matter. The whole long-running saga showed up Britain’s weaknesses shamefully and comically as Britain had ultimately been held under ransom by a simple chicken farmer.

Furthermore, to try to maintain the bond with the newly independent countries, the Commonwealth was set up. Trade between Britain and the Commonwealth countries was urged with enthusiasm. The strain in the relationship between Britain and the Commonwealth however was initiated by the surge in immigration which eventually led to the Commonwealth Immigration Act in 1968 to prevent the flow of African Asians. The global impact of the Act was very damaging; with Commonwealth nations feeling deceived by their mother country. As well as this, trade began to decrease significantly, further hindering the importance of the Commonwealth and Britain’s stability with regards to international trade.

Additionally, Dean Acheson, an ex-American Secretary of state pronounced that “Britain had lost an Empire but not yet found a role”. Still, Macmillan was determined to preserve the mystique of great power status. He set up EFTA to rival the highly successful European Economic Community (EEC), only to see it embarrassingly failing. By 1961, the Conservatives began to regret not joining the EEC therefore decided to apply with much controversy and violent debate from the opposition. Their concern was unnecessary. The French President, General De Gaulle saw Britain as a “Trojan horse” for American influence and was determined to veto British entry. It would take another ten years and two more tries by Wilson and Heath for Britain to finally be accepted into the EEC, but by this time Britain’s stature in the world had truly become threadbare.

Moreover, the “special relationship” with the USA was one which Britain was adamant in maintaining. Britain was heavily dependent on the USA both financially and military which is further evidence of British weakness. Nevertheless the relationship seemed to be in crisis as Britain not only failed to mention the Suez plan in 1956 but also refused to join the “coalition of the willing” and support America in the Yom Kippur War in the early 1970s. The Americans responded with unconcealed hostility, showing that this stable relationship had noticeable cracks.

Finally, British withdrawal from the East of Suez, as Kenneth Morgan said, meant that the “last pretence of being world power was being stripped away.” The British economy was suffering considerably between 1951 and 1975. Since Britain was spending 34.5% of its income on defence between 1963 and 1965, Wilson had no choice but to reduce British military commitments. Britain’s far-flung chain of bases was therefore indisputably finished. By 1975, Britain indeed seemed to be becoming “a poorer, smaller country.”  

Yet there are those who argue that there was some form of stability in Britain’s stature in the world that remained. For example, in spite of being rejected twice, Britain did manage to be eventually accepted into the EEC in 1972 under Heath’s government which shows that the advantages of Britain being in the EEC were known to the rest of Europe. The fact that De Gaulle was not present at the third attempt gives way to speculations that he may have vetoed twice previously due to his own hidden agendas. Thus, Britain’s stature in the world may have been stable after all.

Also, Britain’s decolonisation process was one of success. Decolonisation occurred swiftly and without violence in contrast to the civil war that erupted in Belgian and French colonies. Macmillan’s “Wind of Change” speech contributed to the positivity of decolonisation, allowing Britain to remain in good terms Commonwealth countries after independence was granted, presenting the view that Britain was still competent in foreign affairs.

What is more, some will argue that Britain still played important roles in NATO and the Cold War. NATO was set up in 1949 to restrain Soviet threat into Europe, which was achieved with British help.  Since both involved the cooperation between Britain and America, it indicates that the relationship between them was secure. It also linked Britain to Europe which historians could debate is evidence that Britain was still influential.


In conclusion, Britain’s stature in the world was undoubtedly unstable between 1951 and 1975. Britain was lost among powerful European countries, with no Empire and no purpose in world affairs. It could no longer command ambitious military ventures since two World Wars clearly took their toll as Britain’s economy faltered, leaving them with no other option but to rely heavily on the USA. After the Suez crisis publically exposed Britain’s weaknesses, Britain’s influence in Europe and around the world began to fade, the rejections from the EEC only proving that fact. Britain was clearly clinging on to a world role by its fingernails as the relationship with the Commonwealth deteriorated considerably, leaving them with no other influence but NATO. How far Britain can maintain the importance of NATO however is an open question.

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